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1 Introduction
Some of the oldest known written records, such as the Code of Hammurabi, show that hu-
mans have devised rules and customs to govern mating practices for at least 4000 years.
Marital norms have varied over space and time,1 but in broad terms polygyny has been
legal at some time in most societies, monogamy has gained in prevalence over time, and
polyandry has been virtually non-existent.2 Although rules imposing monogamous marriage
on all males appeared already in ancient Greece and Rome (Scheidel, 2008), polygynous
marriage is still legal in about one fourth of all countries (Zeitzen, 2008). Marital patterns
may a¤ect economic outcomes through several channels, such as fertility decisions, invest-
ment in children, reproductive skew, gender di¤erences in well-being, the inter-generational
transmission of material wealth and human capital, intra-family transfers, and more.3 It
is therefore important to understand why some societies are monogamous while others are
polygynous. This paper contributes to this understanding. In particular, it may help un-
derstand why two of the most common norms today are strict monogamy and an arguably
signicant amount of polygyny with a right to marry up to four wives, the former being
common in countries with a largely Christian past and the latter in countries with a largely
Muslim past.
Whether marital norms are driven by the wishes of the rulers (Lagerlöf, 2010) and/or of
the ruled (De La Croix and Mariani, 2015), grassroots individual preferences may inuence
how marital norms develop, because norms that adhere to underlying preferences are not
likely to be contested.4 The theoretical literature on male and female preferences in this
context has given particular attention to the e¤ects of heterogeneity among males. The
1Recent analyses of distributions of Y-chromosome haplotypes provide hard evidence to this e¤ect; see
Balaresque et al. (2015), as well as the references therein.
2Of the 1231 societies covered by Murdocks ethnographic atlas, 4 were polyandrous, 186 monogamous,
and the rest were classied as polygynous (588 of which had frequent polygyny and 453 occasional polygyny).
See Gray (1998).
3For empirical and theoretical research on how family structure a¤ects economic outcomes, see, inter
alia, Becker (1991), Lundberg and Pollak (2008), Tertilt (2005, 2006), Cox and Fafchamps (2008), Edlund
and Lagerlöf (2006), Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Edlund and Kopczuk (2009), Edlund and Machado (2015),
Grossbard (2015), and Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2016).
4This is reminiscent of Alexander (1987), who draws a distinction between ecologically imposed and
socially imposed norms.
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argument is that if females can choose whom they marry and if they rank males according
to some attributes such as wealth or intelligence, females should accept to share high-quality
males with other females, while low-quality males should attract at most one woman (Becker,
1974, 1991, Grossbard, 1976, Low, 1990, Bergstrom, 1994, Lagerlöf, 2005).5 It follows that
one should see low polygyny rates in societies where resource heterogeneity among men is
low (Orians, 1969, Kanazawa and Still, 1999).
That heterogeneity in the opposite sex matters in this context is a well-established fact.6
However, while the theoretical analyses cited above all take such heterogeneity as given,
the attributes of a male at the moment he enters the marriage market in fact depends
on his behaviors in the years preceding that moment. Importantly, his desire to accumulate
resources such as wealth or human capital during these years may depend on how strongly he
cares about achieving greater success in the marriage market. Specically, a males eagerness
to compete with other males for the purpose of attracting more wives should depend on his
preferred number of wives. Following this logic, if all males would prefer to have only one
wife, one should expect little such competition, no or low heterogeneity, and monogamy; by
contrast, if all males would prefer to have many wives, one should expect males to compete
against each other in some way that generates heterogeneity, and polygyny for the winners
of this race. In this paper I rely on this logic to push the theory of mating systems one step
further by analyzing how natural selection shapes male preferences over polygyny rates in
the rst place, and the consequences of these preferences for the maleswillingness to ght
to get mores wives.
Following evolutionary logic, I posit that the ultimate goal of individuals is to maximize
reproductive success. This allows to nd the number of wives a man would like to have if he
could freely choose, and how this depends on exogenously given factors of the environment,
5While the focus of this paper is on male heterogeneity, this is not to say that female heterogeneity does
not matter (Gould, Moav, and Simhon, 2008). Relatedly, in the anthropology and biology literatures it
has been shown that the polygyny rate in a population may depend on the femaleswillingness to trade
faithfulness for a lower polygyny rate (Kokko and Morrell, 2005, Fortunato and Archetti, 2010, Gavrilets,
2012).
6Most human societies that allow polygyny have positive bride prices, so that wealthier men can acquire
more wives than poor ones (Gaulin and Boster, 1990). See also (Boserup, 1970) and Betzig (1993). In other
species, there is clear experimental evidence to this e¤ect, starting with Batemans famous experiments
on drosophilia melanogaster (Bateman, 1948). In evolutionary biology Batemans principle states that the
variability in reproductive success should be larger among males than in females in most species.
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or the ecology, in which the population at hand evolves.7 Given these preferences over
polygyny rates, the willingness of males to ght for more wives can be deduced and used to
determine the set of polygyny rates that are sustainable in the sense that males who have
achieved this polygyny rate would not want to ght further to acquire even more females.
The key contribution of the analysis is to show how male preferences over polygyny rates
and thus the sustainable polygyny rate(s) may ultimately depend on the ecology in which
the population evolves,8 absent any a priori heterogeneity among males.
In the model, males rst go through a ghting stage, in which they are sequentially
matched into pairs. In each pair where at least one male ghts, one of the males is wiped
out from the marriage market. The ghting stage ends when all the remaining males stop
ghting. The amount of ghting thus determines the number of males who can marry in the
end: the more ghting there is, the smaller is the number of such lucky males.9 Following the
ghting stage, a number of households are formed, each household consisting of one lucky
male and his spouse(s). In each household, decisions are taken with respect to fertility as well
as the division of labor between the male and the female(s), the goal being to maximize the
expected number of children that survive to sexual maturity, i.e., the reproductive success.10
The male provides protection, the female(s) provide(s) care, and both the male and the
female(s) may produce food; the labor division species how each individual allocates time
between these tasks.
7The baseline model relies on a sexist approach, which consists in assuming that females are completely
passive. I relax this assumption when studying the robustness of the results.
8The quest for insights as to how ecological factors a¤ect the evolution of mating systems is common in
the biology literature (see, e.g., Bateman, 1948, Orians, 1969, Emlen and Oring, 1977, Clutton-Brock and
Vincent, 1991, as well as Kokko and Jennions, 2008, and the references therein), as well as in the anthropology
literature (see., e.g, Kaplan, Hooper, and Gurven, 2009, Nettle et al., 2013, and Moya, Snopkowski, and Sear,
2016). To the best of my knowledge, however, in this literature parental care is a one-dimensional variable
(while in my model parents provide three goods to their o¤spring) and focus is often on the e¤ects of spatial
and temporal availability of mates (features that are disregarded here).
9If there is polygyny, some males end up with a higher reproductive success than others. On average,
however, males and females have the same reproductive success.
10While mating success of o¤spring also matters, it is not modeled here. Moreover, I rule out female
heterogeneity because the focus is on male preferences over the number of wives of a given quality, and
I also rule out unfaithfulness by assumption, an approach which is reasonable for human societies where
grand-parents may monitor the behaviors of their sons or daughters in law.
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The exact way in which fertility and labor division impacts reproductive success in turn
depends on the ecology, which in the model is a vector of nine exogenously given parameters.
Some of the ecological parameters pertain to the relative importance of food, protection,
and care in determining child survival, thus allowing to compare, for instance, environments
where shelter is more important than in others, perhaps because of harsh weather conditions
or the prevalence of predators. Other ecological parameters measure the marginal returns
to time spent on di¤erent tasks: the returns to gathering food in the savannah may be quite
di¤erent from the returns to tending crops. Finally, two of the ecological parameters measure
the extent to which protection and care are public goods (food being a private good); for
example, protecting a given number of children against predators may require more of the
fathers time in nomadic pastoralist societies than in sedentary agricultural societies, since
in the latter a durable wall can be built for this purpose.
The analysis reveals whether or not a (lucky) male would benet, in terms of reproduc-
tive success, from having more wives. I nd that males do not necessarily want to simply
maximize the number of wives. Depending on the ecology, the reproductive success of a
lucky male may be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the polygyny rate. This is
because males face a polygyny quantity-quality trade-o¤ : while a greater number of wives
implies a direct gain for the male in the form of a greater number of children, it also entails
an indirect loss in the form of a decrease in the probability that each child survives to sexual
maturity.11
While the presence of this trade-o¤ itself is not surprising per se, the analysis unveils a
striking result: males never prefer intermediate numbers of wives. Depending on the severity
of the quantity-quality trade-o¤, one of two scenarios arises: either a male either always
benets from having more wives, or he prefers both monogamy and high polygyny rates to
intermediate polygyny rates. This nding has deep implications for the maleswillingness
to ght for more wives, since it leads to a bang-bang result: one should either expect to see
a relatively high polygyny rate for successful males, or else monogamy. Indeed, in ecologies
where successful males always benet from having more wives, ghting never ceases.12 By
11The only exception is when the male produces no food and protection is a pure public good: his average
contribution to child success is then not diluted by adding more wives.
12Unless the act of ghting itself has a negative impact on reproductive success, for instance because it
weakens the male for life, or if the ghting technology is such that the biological time constraint becomes
relevant.
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contrast, in ecologies where successful males prefer both monogamy and high polygyny rates
to intermediate polygyny rates, in a society with monogamy males would not want to ght
to get one more wife, and hence monogamy would be sustainable. In sum, this result shows
that in certain environments monogamy is not a mystery that needs an explanation, for in
these environments it arises naturally, as a consequence of fundamental evolutionary forces.
The analysis further reveals a novel insight, namely, that the qualitative nature of male
preferences over polygyny rate is intimately linked with his involvement in food production.
In ecologies where the male never engages in food production, he always benets from having
more wives. Indeed, since each wife can provide food and care to her own children, in such
ecologies the rst-order e¤ect of adding one more wife always outweighs the second-order
e¤ect of diluting male protection among more children. Thus, male involvement in food
production is necessary for male reproductive success to decline in the number of wives.
Furthermore, I nd that if a male engages in food production, this must happen for low
polygyny rates: indeed, because food is a fully private good, a male is better o¤ shifting his
time towards producing more protection as the number of children he has to raise grows. For
high enough polygyny rates, the male devotes all his time to protection, and a further increase
in the polygyny rate then enhances reproductive success. This explains why the polygyny
quantity-quality trade-o¤ is always more severe for low than for high polygyny rates, and
hence why males either prefer both monogamy and high polygyny rates to intermediate
polygyny rates, or always want more wives.
The approach used in this paper rests on the idea, delineated by Bergstrom (1996) and
Robson (2001, 2002), that economists may obtain valuable insights about human motiva-
tion by including evolutionary forces in their models.13 It is closely related to the growing
literature on preference evolution (see, e.g., Frank, 1987, Güth and Yaari, 1992, Dekel, Ely,
and Yilankaya, 2007, Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel, 2007, Rayo and Becker, 2007, Robson
and Samuelson, 2011, Alger and Weibull, 2010, 2013). To the best of my knowledge, this
is the rst attempt to derive preferences over polygyny rates from rst principles, however.
As mentioned above, the economics literature on polygyny has hitherto instead focused
on explaining how heterogeneity among males and/or among females impinge on marriage
market equilibria (Becker, 1974, Grossbard, 1976, Bergstrom, 1994, Francesconi, Ghiglino,
and Perry, 2016), on the dynamic feedback loops between polygyny rates and heterogeneity
13Note that the theoretical models in this literature, including the one proposed here, are silent as to
whether traits are genetically or culturally determined.
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(Lagerlöf, 2005, Gould, Moav, and Simhon, 2008, De La Croix and Mariani, 2015), on the
e¤ects of a mismatch in the ages at which males and females marry (Tertilt, 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe and analyze the baseline
model. In Section 3 I lift some of the simplifying assumptions of the baseline model to
check the robustness of the results. While the baseline model focuses on male preferences, I
discuss female preferences over polygyny rates as well as e¢ ciency in Section 4. A conclusion
is provided in Section 5. All the mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Analysis
I model a population in which each individual lives for at most two periods; in the rst period
as a non-productive and non-reproductive child, and in the second period as a productive
and reproductive adult. In each generation the sex ratio is assumed to be balanced at birth,
as evolutionary theory would predict (Fisher, 1930), and for simplicity also at the beginning
of the adult period. The model focuses on behaviors in the adult period, which has two
stages: rst, a mate matching stage, and then a childbearing and child-rearing stage. The
baseline model uses a sexist approach, by assuming that males act while females simply obey
the orders of the males. Analytical convenience is only one of the three reasons for why this
modeling choice is valuable. It may also accurately capture some distant evolutionary past,14
and it allows to highlight the sources of disagreements between males and females, if any, by
determining the extent to which females would favor a di¤erent outcome than that obtained
in the baseline model with passive females; these matters will be analyzed and discussed in
Sections 3 and 4.
The broad lines of the baseline model are as follows. The mate matching stage consists
in ghting between males. A key feature of the model is that the males are assumed to
be identical prior to ghting, and that heterogeneity between males arises only as a result
of ghting. At the end of the mate matching stage, some males have earned the right to
mate; any males who have not earned such a right get nothing (one interpretation being
that they were killed or disabled in the ght). At the beginning of the childbearing and
child-rearing stage, there is thus a number of households, each composed of one male and his
(identical) spouse(s). The male imposes his preferred fertility and household labor division
14In this distant past females may have been completely dependent on males. In such a context, if males
could choose females, it may have been in their interest to choose obedient ones.
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on his spouse(s), his goal being to maximize his own reproductive success,15 dened as the
expected number of his o¤spring that survive to sexual maturity.16
I next proceed to describing and solving the baseline model, starting with a description
of the childbearing and child-rearing stage, and then analysis of the male-ghting stage.
2.1 Childbearing and child-rearing
Consider a male who enters the childbearing and child-rearing stage with k wives.17 He
chooses the number of children per female and the division of labor within the household,
so as to maximize the expected number of children that survive to sexual maturity. The
probability that a child survives to sexual maturity depends on the quantities of food, pro-
tection, and care that it receives.18 Production technologies are given and xed; females
are assumed to have identical production abilities, and likewise for men. The amounts of
food, protection, and care that are produced within a household are determined by the divi-
sion of labor; labor is measured in units of time and the lifetime time budget of each adult
is T 2 (0; 1]. Adults do not consume anything of what they produce,19 and interactions
between households, divorce, and unfaithfulness are ruled out by assumption.20
15This assumption is in line with the literature on the evolution of preferences in situations lacking strategic
interaction, such as the child-rearing stage in my model (Robson and Samuelson, 2011).
16In reality mating success of o¤spring who have survived to sexual maturity also matters for an adults
reproductive success. I can disregard this, however, since the model relies on the simplifying assumption
that all the men who enter the adult stage have an equal chance to mate, and likewise for all the women
who enter the adult stage.
17The term wifeis used for convenience only, since marriage has no function per se. The key assumption
is that both males and females engage in parental care, which is a reasonable assumption for humans and
some other species (see Alger and Cox, 2013 for a review of the biology literature on parental care).
18The terms protection and care should be interpreted broadly. Thus, protection may include shelter
construction and maintenance, active protection against predators, as well as the transmission of human
capital pertaining to such activities. Likewise, care may include the production and mending of clothes,
storytelling, as well as the transmission of knowledge about social rules, plants, and animals.
19Alternatively, the time budget T can be interpreted as the time available to an adult once (s)he has
produced and consumed the amounts of food (s)he needs to survive.
20It would clearly be highly desirable to endogenize the degree of unfaithfulness, but this has to be left
for future research. For the time being, one interpretation of the benchmark model considered here is that
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While returns to labor on any given day are often decreasing, the scale of the analysis
at hand the entire time spent in adulthood calls for the opposite assumption, namely,
non-decreasing returns to labor in any given activity. As an illustration, consider a hunter-
gatherer society, in which there is food that can be hunted and food that can be gathered.
The skills required for successful hunting and gathering are by no means trivial, and it seems
reasonable to think that there are gains to specialization. Furthermore, hunting may require
similar skills as those required for protection against predators. There may also be economies
of scope between gathering and caring, especially if it is possible to engage in both activities
at the same time; for instance, an adult who is gathering food may bring a sleeping child
on her back, or let the child play next to her. Because breast-feeding ties a mother to her
baby and berries do not run away from crying babies, in such a society it would be natural
to assume, then, that females specialize in caring and gathering, while males specialize in
protecting and hunting.
More generally, there are four productive activities that any adult can engage in. The
male specializes in two of them while females specialize in the other two activities. Let
y 2 [0; T ] denote the time that the male devotes to one of the activities, so that he spends
T   y on the other activity, where T 2 (0; 1] is his time budget. Likewise, let xj 2 [0; T ]
denote the time that female j = 1; :::; k devotes to one of the two activities, the rest of
her time being spent on the other activity. The vector (x; y), where x = (x1; :::; xk), is the
household labor division. I focus on household labor divisions in which all the females adopt
the same time allocation, x. Such female-symmetric labor divisions are denoted (x; y).
Any labor division (x; y) gives rise to a certain basket of food, protection, and care. The
goods produced by the male are divided equally between the n k children, while the goods of
a female are divided equally between her own n children; the case where the goods a female
produces are divided equally between all the n k children in the household will be discussed
in Section 3. This in turn gives rise to a certain probability that each child survives to sexual
maturity. Formally, then, one can write the survival probability of a child as a function of
the labor division and the household stucture; I write s for this survival function. Letting
M denote the function that to each household structure (n; k) cum household labor division
(x; y) associates the males reproductive success, I let it take the form
M (x; y; n; k) = k  n  a (n)  s (x; y; n; k) ; (1)
there is strong social control (for instance, although they are not explicitly modeled here, there may be
grand-parents who monitor how their children behave in the adult stage, or the females monitor each other).
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where the function a, which is strictly decreasing, captures the physical toll that childbearing
inicts on a female. For simplicity, I will allow n to take any real value above 1.
The male chooses (x; y; n) 2 [0; 1]2  [1;+1) in order to maximize M (x; y; n; k) (recall
that k is given when this choice is made). For simplicity, I assume that for all parameter
values there exists a unique solution to this problem, and that there always exists some
(x; y; n) 2 [0; 1]2  [1;+1) for which M (x; y; n; k) > 0. Writing (x (k) ; y (k) ; n (k)) for
the unique solution, and fM (k) for the reproductive success thus achieved,
fM (k) =M (x (k) ; y (k) ; n (k) ; k) : (2)
I will provide a detailed analysis of the characterstics of fM (k) after having shown the role
that fM (k) plays in the male ghting stage in the next subsection.
2.2 Male ghting
Turning now to the male-ghting stage, which precedes the childbearing and child-rearing
stage, to x ideas consider to begin the simplest possible approach. Suppose that when
entering the adult stage (from the teenage years) each male has one girlfriend, and that
males are then randomly matched into pairs to play a simultaneous-move game with two
pure strategies, Fight and Peace, and payo¤s as shown in Figure 1.
Peace Fight
Peace fM (1) ;fM (1) 0;fM (2)
Fight fM (2) ; 0 1
2
fM (2) ; 1
2
fM (2)
Figure 1. Payo¤s in the one-shot Fighting game
In this game, that I call the One-round ghting game, if both play Peace, then each gets
to marry his teenage sweetheart and each achieves reproductive success fM (1) (see (2)). If
at least one male plays Fight, then one of them gets to marry both girlfriends while the other
one becomes mateless and remains so forever. The probability that a male who plays Fight
wins, is 1 if the other plays Peace and 1/2 if the other plays Fight. The lucky male achieves
reproductive success fM (2).
Applying a standard evolutionary game theory approach, suppose that each male is
programmed to play a certain strategy in this game, a strategy that he inherited from his
father, and suppose that the payo¤s in Figure 1 represent the payo¤s in the evolutionary
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game. Further allow for mixed strategies, and write  2 [0; 1] for the probability of playing
Fight. Now ponder the following thought experiment: suppose that a given strategy  is
used by almost everyone in the population, except for a small fraction " > 0 of individuals
who use another strategy  0: is there any residentstrategy  that would outperform every
possible mutantstrategy  0 2 [0; 1],  0 6= , in the sense that those who carry the resident
strategy would get a strictly higher reproductive success on average than those who carry
the mutant strategy? More specically: what is the set of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
(ESS) of the One-round ghting game?
Applying standard results (Weibull, 1995), and recalling that fM (k) > 0 for k = 1; 2, one
immediately obtains:
Proposition 1 In the One-round ghting game, there is either one or two evolutionarily
stable strategies:  = 1 (Fight) is always evolutionarily stable, and  = 0 (Peace) is evolu-
tionarily stable if and only if fM (1) > fM (2).
This result has implications for the kind of marital patterns that could prevail in a
population in which all males would play the same evolutionarily stable strategy. First, it
says that bigyny can always be sustained: this is because if other males are expected to
Fight, then it never pays o¤ to play Peace (note that this would be true even under the less
stark assumption that playing Peace against someone playing Fight would give a positive
probability of winning, as long as this probability would be below 1=2). Second, it says that
monogyny can be sustained if only if a male would lose from trying to steal a peaceful males
girlfriend, i.e., if fM (1) > fM (2).
It may seem obvious that a male would always prefer having two wives rather than one,
since this allows him to double the number of children. However, this intuition misses the
fact that when the number of children doubles, the survival probability of each child typically
decreases due to the resulting decline in paternal resources owing to each child. But this
intuition in turn misses the fact that if a male has two wives rather than one, he can adjust
the number of children per female downward to mitigate the decline in survival probability
per child. Overall, then, it is not clear whether a male would necessarily prefer to have
two rather than one wife. Before analyzing these trade-o¤s in greater detail in the next
subsection, I propose a generalization of the One-round ghting game.
In this generalized game there may be up to R  2 rounds, where R 2 N. In each round,
all the males who did not yet lose a ght are matched pairwise, and each male plays either
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Peace or Fight, exactly as above. However, by contrast to the one-round game, now there
are fewer and fewer males around as the number of rounds of ghting increases. Hence, the
stakes are di¤erent in each round, since the number of females per male increases with every
round. Formally, let a (pure) strategy be a number r 2 f0; 1; :::; Rg, which species the
number of rounds in which the male will play Fight, following which he will play Peace. I
maintain the assumptions introduced in the one-round game that (a) in a pair where both
play Peace, both survive and settle down to form a household (thereby exiting the ghting
game); (b) in a pair where one plays Peace and the other Fight, the former loses his females
to the latter; (c) in a pair where both play Fight, one of the males loses his females to the
other, with equal probability for both. Each male is programmed to play a specic strategy.
In a population where all males play strategy r, each male achieves expected reproductive
success
1
2r
 fM (2r) :
For each round of ghting, the number of females per male is doubled, and there is a prob-
ability 1/2 of winning the ght.
The following proposition identies the set of locally evolutionarily stable strategies, i.e.,
strategies r that are evolutionarily stable against the two mutant strategies r0 = r   1 and
r0 = r + 1.21
Proposition 2 In the R-round ghting game, r = R is locally evolutionarily stable, and
r 2 f0; 1; :::; R  1g is locally evolutionarily stable if and only if fM (2r) > fM (2r+1).
This proposition shows that the two main qualitative features of the set of evolutionarily
stable strategies in the One-round ghting game carry over to the R-round ghting game.
First, any level of polygyny such that each lucky male would prefer not to further double the
number of wives by way of ghting against a peaceful rival is locally stable. In particular,
monogyny is locally stable under the same condition as in the One-shot game (too see this,
note that when r = 0 the condition fM (2r) > fM (2r+1) boils down to fM (1) > fM (2)).
Second, it never pays o¤ for a male to stop ghting before the other males do: never stop
ghting(r = R) is always locally stable.22
21Note that I restrict attention to pure strategies; this is done for simplicity.
22Note that if one were instead to look for strategies that are globally stable, i.e., stable against all
alternative strategies, the condition fM (2r) > fM  2r+1 would still be necessary for a strategy r < R to be
stable.
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The set of locally evolutionarily stable strategies in the ghting game determines the set
of polygyny rates that are sustainable:
Denition 1 A polygyny rate k is sustainable if and only if k = 2r for some locally evolu-
tionarily stable r.
Ultimately, then, the set of polygyny rates that are sustainable in a particular society
depends on malespreferences over polygyny rates, as captured by the characteristics of the
male reproductive success function fM . These are analyzed in detail in the next subsection.
2.3 Male preferences over polygyny rates
Acquiring more wives provides a male with the ability to sire a larger number of children,
but it may also reduce the probability that each child survives to sexual maturity. Can the
latter e¤ect be strong enough to outweigh the former e¤ect and thus make the male want to
restrict the number of wives? And if so, will this tend to happen for small or large polygyny
rates? To address these questions, I study the shape of the function fM (see (2)), assuming
for simplicity that it is a continuous function of k; below I will relate the ndings to the
results in the ghting game, stated for integer values of k.
Thus, assume thatM is continuously di¤erentiable in (x; y; n), for any (x; y; n) 2 [0; 1]2
[1;+1). Then, from the envelope theorem:
dfM (k)
dk
=
@M (x (k) ; y (k) ; n (k) ; k)
@k
(3)
= n  a (n) 

s (x; y; n; k) + k  @s (x; y; n; k)
@k

j(x;y;n;k)=(x(k);y(k);n(k);k)
:
An increase in the number of wives a¤ects male reproductive success positively by increasing
the number of children; this rst-order e¤ect is captured by the term s (x; y; n; k) > 0. How-
ever, such an increase also a¤ects reproductive success negatively if the survival probability
drops, something which would a¤ect the children of all wives, even the inframarginal ones;
this second-order e¤ect is captured by the second term inside the square brackets. Borrowing
terminology from price theory, I dene the child survival elasticity as:
s =
@s (x; y; n; k)
@k
 k
s (x; y; n; k)
(4)
=
@s (x; y; n; k)
s (x; y; n; k)

@k
k
:
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As is shown in the second line, this elasticity measures the percent change in survival prob-
ability relative to the percent change in the number of wives. Since
dfM (k)
dk
= [n  a (n)  s (x; y; n; k)  (1 + s)]j(x;y;n;k)=(x(k);y(k);n(k);k) ;
I conclude:
Remark 1 The sign of d
fM(k)
dk
is determined by the sign of 1 + s:
(i) d
fM(k)
dk
> 0 i¤ child survival is inelastic (s >  1);
(ii) d
fM(k)
dk
= 0 i¤ child survival is unit elastic (s =  1);
(iii) d
fM(k)
dk
< 0 i¤ child survival is elastic (s <  1).
Hence, male preferences for polygyny rates hinge on whether child survival is elastic or
not. From the expression in the second line of (4), it is clear that the denominator, @k
k
,
becomes smaller as k increases, a feature that contributes to rendering child survival more
elastic as k increases. But if the numerator moves in the opposite direction, the net e¤ect
may be that child survival becomes less elastic as k increases. In general, it is not clear what
the net e¤ect would be. However, the child survival elasticity may be expected to depend
on a number of factors in the environment in which the population evolves: how easy is it
to nd food? how strong is the need to protect the children from predators? how much
education does a child need to learn how to survive? etc. In order to get a grip on how
factors in the environment may a¤ect the child survival elasticity, and therefore also male
preferences over polygyny rates, I study a specic child survival function, which is general
yet analytically tractable.
To make the description more concrete, I use a specic setting from our evolutionary
past, namely, a hunter-gatherer setting (other settings can easily be imagined). The four
productive activities that the adults can engage in are hunting game, gathering berries,
caring, and protecting. Letting Gi and Hi denote the amounts of gathered and hunted food
that child i receives, and Pi and Ci the amounts of protection and care that (s)he receives,
I assume that the probability that the child (whether a boy or a girl) survives to sexual
maturity is
a (n)  S (Ci; Gi; Hi; Pi) ;
where
S (Ci; Gi; Hi; Pi) = P

i  Ci  (Gi +Hi) ; (5)
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for ; ;  2 (0; 1] and  > 0. This functional form captures two realistic features. First,
food, protection, and care are all essential goods: food is useless unless some protection and
some care is provided, and vice versa. Second, gathered food and hunted food are perfectly
substitutable, except for the fact that gathered food may be more important than hunted
food (if  > 1), equally important (if  = 1), or less important (if  < 1), as this may
depend on the nutritional attributes of the gathered food in the location occupied by the
population at hand. The parameters , , and  measure how protection, care, and total
food intake, respectively, impact survival probability. Again, these parameter values would
typically depend on the local environment: protection and care is relatively more important
if there are many predators around and if there are many dangers that children need to learn
to avoid. I assume that +   1; as will be seen below, this ensures that S always takes a
value between 0 and 1. Furthermore, below it will be assumed that a (n) = max f0; 1  bng
for b 2 (0; 1), where 1=b can be thought of as the maximum number of children a female can
have before she dies with certainty (in which case the children die since the mothers inputs
are essential).23
The basket (Ci; Gi; Hi; Pi) that a child receives depends not only on the total amounts
of hunted and gathered food, protection, and care produced by the adults in the household,
but also on whether these are private or public goods. Let y denote the time that the male
devotes to hunting, T   y being the time he devotes to protecting the children, and let xj
denote the time that female j = 1; :::; k devotes to gathering, and T   xj the time that she
spends on caring, where the parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the extent to which a female may
gather food while providing care. While food is a private good, care and protection may be
public goods; for instance, a wall around the village protects all the children equally well,
and a class about poisonous plants may benet several children simultaneously. Letting an
index i = 1; 2; ::K refer to the ith child in the household, where K  kn is the total number
of children, child i receives the amount
Hi (y) =
y
kn
(6)
of hunted food, where  > 0 is the marginal return to male e¤ort devoted to hunting, and
the amount
Gi (xi) =
xi
n
; (7)
23Here the physical toll is modeled as a scaling factor: ceteris paribus, the more children a woman has,
the smaller is the survival probability of each of her children. Alternatively, one could let the physical toll
have an impact on female productivity. This is left for future research.
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of gathered food, where  > 0 is the marginal return to female e¤ort devoted to gathering.24
By contrast to food, protection may be a public good. Formally, let
Pi (y) =
T   y
(kn)
(8)
be the amount of protection that child i receives, where  2 [0; 1] measures the extent to
which protection is a public good. In the extreme case where  = 0, protection is a pure
public good, and each child receives the full benet of the total amount of protection produced
by the father: Pi (y) = T   y. At the other extreme, if  = 1, protection is a fully private
good, and each child receives 1=K of the total amount produced: Pi (y) = (T   y) =K. By
a slight abuse of language, henceforth  will be referred to as the degree of publicness of
protection, where a lower  means a greater degree of publicness. Likewise, the amount of
care that child i receives is
Ci (xi) =
T   xi
n
; (9)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the extent to which care is a public good. If  = 0, care is a pure
public good, while if  = 1, it is a private good. Henceforth  will be referred to as the degree
of publicness of care (where a smaller value of  implies a greater degree of publicness).
This completes the description of the setup. In the extremely long run, everything in
life, including the features and the prevalence of animals and plants eaten by humans, is
endogenous. However, the speeds at which di¤erent elements of a human society evolve,
di¤er. In the model, I assume that the production technology, the degrees of publicness of
protection and care, and the child survival probability function, are exogenous and xed,
and I refer to the associated set of parameters as the ecology. Formally, then, the ecology is
the vector  =(; ; ; ; ; ; ;  ; ). The ecology determines how parental time allocations
are transformed into o¤spring success. Below it will be seen how the ecology a¤ects the set
of sustainable polygyny rates.
Fixing the number of wives k and the ecology , and replacing Hi, Gi, Pi, and Ci in
S (Ci; Gi; Hi; Pi) with the expressions in (6), (7), (8), and (9), the child survival probability
s as a function of the female-symmetric25 household labor division (x; y), the fertility rate
24Constant returns to e¤ort are perfectly compatible with specialization, if, for instance, the marginal
return to male e¤ort devoted to gathering and to caring is strictly lower than that of a female, and the
marginal return to female e¤ort devoted to hunting and to protecting is strictly lower than that of the male.
25Thanks to the constant returns to time devoted to gathering and to care, this focus entails no loss of
generality.
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n, and the number of wives k writes
s (x; y; n; k) =

T   y
(kn)



T   x
n



x
n
+
y
kn

; (10)
so that the males reproductive success (see (1)) writes
M (x; y; n; k) = k  n  a (n) 

T   y
(kn)



T   x
n



x
n
+
y
kn

: (11)
For any given number of wives k, the male chooses (x; y; n) 2 [0; T ]2N in order to maximize
this. The solution is as follows.
Proposition 3 For any ecology  and any number of wives k, there exists a unique fer-
tility rate n and a unique female-symmetric household labor division (x (k) ; y (k)) that
maximizes M (x; y; n; k).
The exact expressions for x (k), y (k), and n are as follows. First, the preferred fertility
rate does not depend on k:
n = max

1;
1       
2        
1
b

: (12)
For any given polygyny rate k  1, an increase in fertility means that each child gets
less food, and less (or as much) protection and care. The ensuing decline in average child
success eventually outweighs the direct, positive impact of fertility on male reproductive
success. This trade-o¤ may be so severe that having one child per female maximizes male
reproductive success. When the preferred number of children exceeds one, it is a fraction
1   
2    of the maximum number of children that a female can get (1=b), and it varies in
intuitive ways with the ecology. First, if protection and/or care becomes a more private good,
i.e.,  and/or  increases, there is less protection and/or care per child, and the preferred
fertility rate declines. The parameters , , and  have the same qualitative e¤ect, because
an increase of any of these parameter values is as if the corresponding good became more
private in nature. Finally, the preferred fertility rate does not depend on the relative e¤ect
of food produced by the male compared to that produced by the females (= ()), nor on
the economies of scope in female production (), because while these parameters a¤ect the
malespreferred household labor division, they do not a¤ect how food and care is being
shared among the households children.
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Second, for the household labor division, to simplify the notation let   = (); this
ratio measures the importance of food contributed by the male relative to that contributed
by the females. Two cases arise: if 
+
 ,
(x (k) ; y (k)) =
8>><>>:

T
(+)
; 0

if k  (+)

(+)kT T
k(++)
; (+)T kT
(++)

if k 2
h

+
; (+)

i
 
0; T
+

if k  
+
;
(13)
and if 
+
> ,
(x (k) ; y (k)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(T; 0) if k  

T; T
+
  kT
(+)

if k 2
h

+ (++) ;


i
(+)kT T
k(++)
; (+)T kT
(++)

if k 2
h

+
; 
+ (++)
i
 
0; T
+

if k  
+
:
(14)
A few features are noteworthy. First, the time that the male spends on food production,
y (k), is weakly decreasing in k. This is because an increase in the number of wives k implies
that the males food output is shared between a larger number of children, and, hence, to
an increase in the relative impact of time spent by females on the total amount of food that
each child receives (its as if the females became more productive in food production). As
a result, an increase in k makes the male adjust the labor division by reducing male food
production and increasing female food production. Eventually, for k large enough, all the
food is produced by the females (y (k) = 0). As will be seen below this feature is linked
with the qualitative characteristics of male preferences over polygyny rates. Second, most
comparative statics results stated in the proposition are straightforward. Thus, comparing
two ecologies, with  and  0 >  , respectively, the marginal benet from producing food for
both males and females is larger in the latter and therefore both the male and the female(s)
spend more time on food production in the latter ecology. Likewise, the male spends less
time and the female(s) more time on food production in ecologies where protection is more
important (a higher ), while the opposite occurs in ecologies where female care is more
important (a higher ). Similarly, in ecologies with greater economies of scope between the
two female activities (a higher ), the cost for females of allocating time away from caring is
smaller, and hence, female food production is larger; this in turn entails a smaller marginal
e¤ect of male food production on child success, and hence the male devotes less time to food
production.
Proposition 3 implies that for any ecology  and any number of wives k, the achieved
male reproductive success is uniquely determined; in other words, there is a unique value
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associated to each k (formally, fM is a function rather than a correspondence). I am therefore
in a position to turn to the main question, namely, does fM increase or decrease as k increases?
In the following proposition, which states the answer to this question,
^  x
 (1) + (1  ) y (1)
 [x (1) + y (1)]
; (15)
and k^ is implictly dened by the equation
(1  )  x

k^

= (   1 + ) 
y

k^

k^
: (16)
Proposition 4 Consider a male who, for any given number of wives k  1, chooses (x; y; n)
so as to achieve reproductive success fM (k) (see (2)). For such a male:
(i) if y (1) = 0 or if   ^, then dfM(k)
dk
 0 for all k  1 (the inequality being strict if
y (1) = 0 and  6= 1, or if  < ^);
(ii) if y (1) > 0 and  > ^, then there exists k^ > 1 such that d
fM(k)
dk
< 0 for all k 2

1; k^

and d
fM(k)
dk
> 0 for all k > k^;
(iii) if  = 1, then fM (1)  fM (k) for all k > 1, the inequality being strict if and only if
y (1) > 0.
In sum, male reproductive success follows one of three possible patterns: it may be
decreasing, increasing, or non-monotonic in the polygyny rate. Specically, a male would:
(i) prefer monogamy to any polygyny rate if  =  = 1, the preference being strict if
y (1) > 0; (ii) strictly prefer monogamy to low polygyny rates, and high polygyny rates
to monogamy, if y (1) and  > ^; and (iii) prefer any polygyny rate k > 1 to monogamy
otherwise. Interestingly, a male cannot prefer intermediate polygyny rates to both low and
high ones.
The proposition reveals that two key forces are at play. First, the degree of publicness
of protection, , is central. The greater is the public nature of protection (i.e., the lower is
), the more likely is the male to benet from an increase in the number of wives. In the
extreme case where protection is a pure public good ( = 0), he benets from an increase
in k at all polygyny levels. By continuity, the same result obtains as long as  is su¢ ciently
small (  ^). This result is intuitive: if protection is quite public in nature, the male can
feed many mouths while also providing protection to many children.
The second key force, which is novel in the literature, is intimately linked to the division
of labor. The proposition indeed reveals that whether the male engages in food production or
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not matters for the qualitative nature of his preferences over polygyny rates, as long as  > 0
so that protection is not a pure public good. Thus, if he devotes all his time to protection for
any polygyny rate (a su¢ cient condition for this is that y (1) = 0) he always benets from
having more wives, whereas if he engages in food production for certain family structures (i.e.,
if y (1) > 0) his reproductive success may exhibit decreasing marginal returns to polygyny.
The reason for this is as follows. If the male engages in food production, an increase in
k means that each child gets less food and also less protection. The resulting reduction
in child survival probability outweighs the rst-order gain from increasing k if protection
is su¢ ciently private in nature (i.e., if  is high enough), which is intuitive. Interestingly,
if this happens, it happens either for all polygyny rates (case (iii) in the proposition) or
only for low polygyny rates (case (ii)). In other words, a male cannot prefer intermediate
polygyny rates to both low and high ones. This feature is intimately linked to the division of
labor: indeed, as k becomes larger, the male shifts the labor division in favor of more female
food production and less male food production, since his time then becomes relatively more
valuable when used protecting the children. But beyond some polygyny level the labor
division shift ceases: the male then produces only protection. Adding more wives must then
be benecial as long as the protection is somewhat public in nature ( < 1).
Thanks to Proposition 4, I am now in a position to characterize the set of sustainable
polygyny rates.
2.4 Sustainable polygyny rates
Here I return to the case where the number of wives k is an integer. To be more precise,
since any sustainable polygyny rate equals 2r for some r 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; Rg (see Denition
1), I restrict attention to polygyny rates k 2 1; 2; 4; :::; 2R	. Combining the results on
the male ghting game (Proposition 2) with those on male preferences over polygyny rates
(Proposition 4), I obtain the following proposition, where k^ is dened in (16):
Proposition 5 Consider a population in which males play the R-round ghting game, and
where, in each household formed following the ghting game, the male imposes his preferred
fertility rate as well as his preferred division of labor on his wives. Then the set of sustainable
polygyny rates is as follows:
(i) if y (1) = 0 or if   ^, the only sustainable polygyny rate is k = 2R;
(ii) if y (1) > 0 and  > ^, any polygyny rate k 2 1; 2; 4; :::; 2R	 such that k  k^ is
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sustainable, and so is k = 2R;
(iii) if  = 1, any polygyny rate k 2 1; 2; 4; :::; 2R	 is sustainable.
This result is striking for two reasons.26 First, there is a bang-bang e¤ect: either only
the highest possible polygyny rate is sustainable (case (i)), or the highest rate as well as the
lowest rates are sustainable (case (ii)). This is explained by the fact that whenever male
preferences are non-monotonic over polygyny rates, the male prefers small to intermediate
rates. Second, whether low polygyny rates are sustainable or not is correlated with the
extent to which the male engages in food production: for low rates to be sustainable, it must
be that the male engages in food production. Male engagement in food production means
that some of his time is used producing a good that is fully private, which in turn means
that adding more wives and therefore more children lessens the males contribution to child
survival. Put di¤erently, male engagement in food production is a sign that the ecology is
harsh enough for the male not to focus his entire time on producing the somewhat public
good protection. This in turn is a sign that the inframarginal children may su¤er so much if
more children are added, that the males reproductive success declines. Since, as discussed
above, male food production declines with the number of wives, this severe trade-o¤ can
only appear for low polygyny rates. Hence, in such ecologies monogamy and low polygyny
rates (below k^) are sustainable, while intermediate polygyny rates (slightly above k^) are not.
If, by contrast, the ecology is generous enough for the male to produce no food, or if the
degree of publicness of protection is large enough, male reproductive success never su¤ers
from adding more wives, and each male then always benets from ghting more than other
males, and the only sustainable poygyny rate is the maximal one.
Prior to moving on to the robustness analysis, it is worth noticing that in this model a
preference for monogamy over low polygyny rates go hand in hand with low fertility, since
both are favored by a high value of .
3 Robustness
In this section I lift some of the simplifying assumptions used in the baseline model to check
the robustness of the results. I thus study three extensions of the baseline model.
26In this discussion I disregard the extreme and unlikely case where protection is a fully private good and
the marginal return to protection is constant, i.e.,  = 1.
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3.1 Decentralization of time allocation decisions
Until now I have assumed that the male imposes his preferred fertility and labor division
on his (obedient) wives. Do the results depend on this assumption? Here I investigate this
question by giving each woman full decision-making power over her own time allocation.
The interaction within a household unfolds as follows. Given that he has successfully
fought to get the right to marry k women, the male rst chooses the fertility n per wife.
Each female j = 1; :::; k then chooses the time allocation xj that maximizes her reproductive
success (see below), taking the males and the other femalestime allocations as given, and
the male chooses the time allocation y that maximizes his reproductive success, taking the
females time allocations as given. Formally, given k and n, the situation at hand is a
simultaneous-move game with k + 1 players; each female player j = 1; :::; k has strategy
xj and strategy set [0; T ], while the male player has strategy y and strategy set [0; T ]. To
complete the description of the game, it is necessary to dene each players payo¤ as a
function of the strategy prole (x; y), where x = (x1; :::; xk). Starting with the females, the
reproductive success of female j, and hence her payo¤ in the game, writes
FD (xj; y) = n  a (n)  sD (xj; y) ; (17)
where
sD (xj; y) =

T   y
(kn)



T   xj
n



xj
n
+
y
kn

: (18)
Hence, the reproductive success of the male writes
MD (x; y) =
kX
j=1
F (xj; y) =
kX
j=1
a (n)  n  s (xj; y) ; (19)
where x = (x1; :::; xk). The letterD (for decentralization) is used to di¤erentiate the survival
and male success functions from the ones in the analysis above; note that I here omit the
arguments n and k, since those are given when time allocations are chosen.
The following proposition shows that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which
coincides with the males preferred labor division described in the previous section:
Proposition 6 Suppose that in each household the male imposes some fertility rate n on his
wives, and that the male as well as each wife then chooses his or her own time allocation. For
any ecology  and any household composition (k; n), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
time allocation,
 
xD; yD

, which is female-symmetric and such that xD = x (k) and yD =
y (k), where (x (k) ; y (k)) is the males preferred labor division (see Proposition 3).
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In this model the interests of the male and the females are aligned when it comes to
the division of labor: for a given family composition they all want to maximize the prob-
ability that the children survive.27 This explains why there exists a Nash equilibrium that
implements the males preferred division of labor. Of course, alignment of interest does not
necessarily imply that there is a unique equilibrium; however, the proposition shows that
uniqueness does obtain in this setting.
In sum:
Proposition 7 Consider a population in which males play the R-round ghting game, and
where, in each household formed following the ghting game, the male imposes his preferred
fertility rate on his wives, and the male as well as each wife then chooses his or her own time
allocation. Suppose further that in each household the male and his wives play the unique
Nash equilibrium time allocation. Then the set of sustainable polygyny rates is the same as
in a population where the male imposes his preferred division of labor.
3.2 Allomothering
In the analysis above, it was assumed that each mother provides only for her own children;
I will refer to this as private provisioning. Would the results be qualitatively di¤erent if,
instead, women had to share the food and the care that they produce equally among all the
children in the household? Here I characterize male and female behaviors and the ensuing
implications for the set of sustainable polygyny rates under the latter assumption, a state of
a¤airs I will refer to as allomothering (Hrdy, 2009).
Using a superindex A for allomothering,the reproductive success of each female is
FA (x; y) = n  a (n)  sA (x; y) ; (20)
where
sA (x; y) =

1  y
(kn)


 Pk
j=1 (1  xj)
(kn)
!

 

Pk
j=1 xj
kn
+
y
kn
!
: (21)
Compared to the expression in (10), the amount of care that a child receives now depends
on the sum of the femalescontributions towards the production of care. It follows that the
27In particular, there is no opportunity cost of time. The results would likely be di¤erent in a model that
allows for unfaithfulness, an issue that is left for future research.
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reproductive success of a male is
MA (x; y) = k  n  a (n)  sA (x; y) : (22)
The following proposition characterizes the set of Nash equilibrium time allocations:28
Proposition 8 Suppose that in each household the male imposes some fertility rate n on
his wives, that the male as well as each wife then chooses his or her own time allocation, and
that allomothering applies. For any ecology  and any household composition (k; n), there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium time allocation,
 
xA; yA

, which is female-symmetric and
identical to the one under private provisioning: xA = x (k) and yA = y (k).
It may come as a surprise that the equilibrium time allocation is the same as under
private provisioning, since intuition suggests that under allomothering the females would
have an incentive to free ride on each other. However, the result is readily explained by
the fact that, by assumption, females must devote all of their time to either food or care
production: in other words, there is no opportunity cost of time, and therefore no incentive
to free ride.
Although the equilibrium time allocations are the same as under private provisioning,
reproductive success is generally higher under allomothering, since now each child benets
from the care produced by all the females. Formally, let ~MA (k) denote male reproductive
success as a function of the polygyny rate k under allomothering. Then:
~MA (k) = k  a (n)  n  sA (x (k) ; y (k)) (23)
= k(1 )  fM (k) ;
where fM (k) is the male reproductive success under private provisioning (see (2)). An im-
mediate implication of this equation is that the preferred fertility rate is the same as under
private provisioning. Another immediate remark is that as soon as care is a somewhat public
good ( < 1), reproductive success is higher than under private provisioning. Will this have
implications for the set of sustainable polygyny rates? In the next proposition, which states
the result,
  ^+  (1  )

;
28Formally, the game that is being analyzed is a simultaneous-move game with k + 1 players, where each
player has strategy set [0; T ], where the strategy of female j = 1; :::; k is denoted xj , the strategy of the male
is denoted y, and the payo¤ to female j is given in (20) while the payo¤ to the male in (22).
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and k is implicitly dened by the equation
[1  +  (1  )]  x  k = [   1 +    (1  )]  y  kk : (24a)
Proposition 9 Consider a population in which males play the R-round ghting game, and
where, in each household formed following the ghting game, the male imposes his preferred
fertility rate on his wives, that the male as well as each wife then chooses his or her own
time allocation, and that allomothering applies. Then the set of sustainable polygyny rates
is as follows:
(i) if y (1) = 0 or if   , the only sustainable polygyny rate is k = 2R;
(ii) if y (1) > 0 and  > , any polygyny rate k  k in the set 1; 2; 4; :::; 2R	 is sustainable,
and so is k = 2R;
(iii) if  = 1, any polygyny rate in the set

1; 2; 4; :::; 2R
	
is sustainable.
In sum, the qualitative features of the set of sustainable polygyny rates obtained under
private female provisioning, are maintained under allomothering.
3.3 Cost of ghting
In the analysis above, ghting entailed no cost beyond that associated with losing a ght.
Consider again the baseline model studied in Section 2, but suppose now that ghting entails
a cost even for the winners. Specically, assume that each round of successful ghting means
that any gain is discounted by a factor  2 (0; 1], the baseline model corresponding to the
special case  = 1. Clearly, Proposition 2 then generalizes to:
Proposition 10 In the R-round ghting game, r = R is locally evolutionarily stable, and
any r 2 f0; 1; :::; R  1g such that fM (2r) >   fM (2r+1) is also locally evolutionarily stable.
Any polygyny rate such that a male would not have an incentive to ght more than
other males is sustainable. Hence, whenever male reproductive success fM is decreasing in
the polygyny rate, the presence of a discount factor  2 (0; 1] makes no di¤erence: whether
 = 1 or  < 1, a male does not have an incentive to ght more than other males. By
contrast, such a discount factor can make a di¤erence when fM is increasing in the polygyny
rate. The following additional result on the shape of fM will be instrumental to state the
general result.
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Proposition 11 Whenever male reproductive success is increasing in the number of wives,
the rate at which it increases is bounded above: d
fM(k)
dk
 [n  a (n)  s (x (k) ; y (k) ; n; k)],
with a strict inequality if and only if  > 0 or y (k) > 0. Furthermore, the value of
the upper bound declines as k increases unless  = y (k) = 0, in which case d
fM(k)
dk
=
n  a (n)  s (x (k) ; y (k) ; n; k), which is then a constant.
Stated di¤erently, the marginal benet of adding more wives cannot exceed the rst-order
e¤ect thereof. Moreover, this rst-order e¤ect becomes smaller as k increases as soon as such
an increase means that each child gets less protection and/or food from the father. I am
now in a position to show:
Proposition 12 Consider a population in which males play the R-round ghting game, and
where, in each household formed following the ghting game, the male imposes his preferred
fertility rate as well as his preferred division of labor on his wives. Suppose further that
ghting entails a cost, modeled by way of the discount factor  2 (0; 1]. Then there exists ^
such that:
(A) For any  2 (0; ^], any polygyny rate k in the set 1; 2; 22; :::; 2R	 is sustainable;
(B) For any  2 (^; 1], three cases arise:
(B.i) if y (1) = 0 or   ^, there exists rP 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; Rg such that any polygyny rate k
in the set

1; 2; 22; :::; 2R
	
which is larger or equal to 2r
P
is sustainable;
(B.ii) if y (1) > 0 and  > ^, there exists rM 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; Rg and rN 2 rM ; rM + 1; :::; R	
such that any polygyny rate k in the set

1; 2; 22; :::; 2R
	
which is smaller or equal to 2r
M
or
larger or equal to 2r
N
is sustainable;
(B.iii) if  = 1, any polygyny rate in the set

1; 2; :::; 2R
	
is sustainable.
An intrinsic ghting cost tilts the balance in favor of lower polygyny rates: for instance,
even when a male would always benet from having more wives, polygyny rates below the
highest possible one (2R) are sustainable. In fact, if the cost of ghting is severe enough (
is close to 0 case (A) of the proposition), males have an incentive to stop ghting at all
polygyny levels, and all polygyny levels are then sustainable in any ecology. Still, for  large
enough, the qualitative results obtained in the baseline model are conrmed, in the sense
that the bang-bang e¤ect is still present: either only a subset of the highest polygyny rates
are sustainable (case (B.i)), or a subset of the highest rates as well as the lowest rates are
sustainable (case (B.ii)).
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4 Discussion
4.1 Female preferences
The approach adopted in the baseline model was a sexist one: the males are the sole decision-
makers in the ghting as well as in the childbearing and child-rearing stages, while the females
obey the orders of their husbands. It was shown in Section 3.1 that this assumption entails no
loss of generality when it comes to decisions pertaining to the childbearing and child-rearing
stages, because in this model the female interests are aligned with those of their husbands
at that point. However, is this also true when it comes to household composition? Here I
characterize the females preferences over polygyny rates, by studying the shape of female
reproductive success eF (k) = fM (k)
k
; (25)
where fM (k) is dened in (2).
The following proposition shows that female preferences di¤er starkly from male ones:
Proposition 13 Suppose that in each household composed of one male and k wives the
preferred fertility rate n and the preferred time allocation (x (k) ; y (k)) are used, and that
private provisioning applies. Then, in each ecology  the reproductive success of a female is
strictly decreasing in the polygyny rate k, unless  = y (1) = 0, in which case it is constant
in k.
The intuition behind this result is clear: an increase in the number of wives implies that
each females brood gets a smaller fraction of male outputs, and this necessarily reduces fe-
male reproductive success. The only exception to this rule arises in the (arguably inexistent)
case where the totality of the male output is a pure public good: this occurs if the male
produces no food (y (1) = 0) and protection is a pure public good ( = 0).
In sum, under private provisioning, in any ecology female reproductive success declines
as the rate of polygyny rises, and the preferred family composition of females is monogamy.
By contrast, conditional on mating, males seldom prefer monogamy. In light of Propositions
4, 5, and 13 I conclude that there exists only one case in which both males and females
are fully satised with a sustainable polygyny rate, in the sense that they would not prefer
any other polygyny rate: this occurs when  = 1, in which case both males and females
prefer monogamy to any positive rate of polygyny. For ecologies in which  6= 1, one of
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the following three cases applies. (A) Females are fully satised but males are not: this
happens when monogamy is sustainable and males do not ght (r 0), although conditional
on mating males would in fact prefer the largest sustainable polygyny rate (k = 2R). (B)
Males are fully satised and females are maximally dissatised: this happens when r = R
in the ghting game. (C) Both males and females are dissatised: this happens when males
play some 0 < r < R in the ghting game; males may in fact be maximally dissatised in
this case.
The conclusions are di¤erent under allomothering, as is shown in the next proposition (the
proof is omitted, for it is readily seen that female reproductive success under allomothering
equals k(1 ) 1 times those of a male under private provisioning, so the proof of Proposition
4 can be directly adapted to the situation at hand). Let
~  ^  1   (1  )

: (26)
Proposition 14 Suppose that in each household composed of one male and k wives the
preferred fertility rate n and the preferred time allocation (x (k) ; y (k)) are used, and that
allmothering applies. Then, females:
(i) prefer monogamy to any polygyny rate if    (1  ) =, the preference being strict if
and only if y (1) > 0;
(ii) strictly prefer monogamy to low polygyny rates, and high polygyny rates to monogamy,
if y (1) > 0 and  2 (~;  (1  ) =);
(iii) (weakly) prefer any polygyny rate k > 1 to monogamy if y (1) = 0 or if  2 [0; ~].
While polygyny still entails a reduction in the contribution of the male to each females
brood, females now also derive some benet from there being other wives as long as care
is a somewhat public good ( < 1). Hence, female preferences under allmothering are
qualitatively similar to male preferences under private provisioning. Importantly, however,
here also the privateness of care () matters. If care is very private (i.e., if  is high), a female
benets only a little from other wives, and she then prefers monogamy over all polygyny
rates even if protection is almost a fully public good (i.e., even for low valus of ), while
under private provisioning, protection had to be fully private ( = 1=) for males to prefer
monogamy over all polygyny rates. But if both  and  are small, females no longer have a
strict preference for monogamy. Thus, for intermediary degrees of aggregate privateness
(+ ), female preferences are non-monotonic in the polygyny rate, and for low levels of
aggregate privateness, females prefer polygyny to monogamy.
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Figure 1: The di¤erence between male and female reproductive success under allomothering,
as a function of the polygyny rate (k) and the degree of publicness of male care (), for
 =  = 1,  = 0:5,  = 0:75,  = 1,  = 0:1,  = 0:6, and n = 5, and for two di¤erent
degrees of publicness of female care: in blue, a fully private good ( = 1), and in red, a
somewhat public good ( = 0:25)
4.2 Battle of the sexes
While the fact that females and males typically have di¤erent preferences over polygyny rates
is not surprising,29 an arguably interesting by-product of the model is its ability to provide
insights about how the magnitude of the disagreement between females and males depends
on the ecology. This disagreement being literally about life and death, it may be expected
to a¤ect the quality of relations between men and women. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows
the di¤erence between the reproductive success of a lucky male and that of a female, as a
function of the degree of publicness of male care and the polygyny rate. The graph suggests
that for any , the di¤erence increases (from zero for k = 1) as k increases. Furthermore,
for any k, the di¤erence is smaller the higher is : in sum, in this example relations between
males and females may be expected to be more pacic in ecologies where male care is a
relatively private good.
29This is consistent with the observation that the degree of polygyny in a society may be expected to
depend on whether females are free to choose or are coerced into polygynous marriages (Gibson and Mace,
2007, Winking et al., 2013).
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4.3 E¢ ciency
In a distant enough evolutionary past, there were no institutions. However, once institutions
emerged, they opened the door to reection about what is good for society as a whole.
This might have been particularly relevant in populations with intense competition between
groups, since more e¢ cient groups may have given their members an edge in the evolutionary
race. Modeling group competition is beyond the scope of this paper.30 Here I simply derive
an e¢ ciency result, which may provide some insights regarding the direction in which group
competition may have pushed rules on polygyny rates.
The male preferences derived above apply to lucky males, i.e., preferences conditional
on being successful at mating. But evolutionary theory predicts that at birth the expected
reproductive success of males must be equal to that of females, and that the sex ratio equals
one (Fisher, 1930). Hence, the polygyny rate that maximizes the reproductive success of
males at birth and thus behind the veil of ignorance as to who will be lucky and who
will be unlucky in the ghting game coincides with the polygyny rate that maximizes
female reproductive success. Female preferences are thus of particular interest when it comes
to understanding how resources may be utilized e¢ ciently at the level of the group. In
a nutshell, my analysis suggests that while group competition may be expected to favor
monogamy in many ecologies, allomothering sometimes makes polygyny attractive for the
group, even absent the fact that polygyny makes some male labor available for ghting wars.
Formally, Propositions 13 and 14 imply:
Corollary 1 Under private provisioning, monogamy (k = 1) is e¢ cient in any ecology ,
and it is the unique e¢ cient polygyny rate for any ecology such that   y (1) > 0. Under
allomothering, monogamy is e¢ cient in any ecology  such that    (1  ) = (and it is
the unique e¢ cient polygyny rate if, moreover, y (1) > 0), while maximal polygyny (k = 2R)
is the unique e¢ cient polygyny rate if  <  (1  ) =.
There are two striking aspects here. First, polygyny can be e¢ cient only under allo-
mothering. Second, there is bang-bang result under allomothering: it is either minimal or
maximal polygyny that is e¢ cient. The intuition is clear: either the negative e¤ect of dilut-
ing male outputs over more than one females children always outweighs the positive e¤ect
30Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson (2012) show that monogamy is favored by between-group competition if
it leads to a reallocation of resources from wasteful activties to paternal investment.
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of sharing total female outputs among all the children in the household, or the former e¤ect
is small enough to be outweighed for high enough polygyny rates (when the male devotes all
his time to protection), which happens if protection is public enough in nature.31
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel approach to the study of the evolution of polygyny. The key
argument is that in our evolutionary past male preferences over polygyny rates would have
depended on the ecology in which the population at hand was evolving, that these prefer-
ences in turn determined malesincentives to ght with each other to acquire more wives,
incentives that ultimately may have shaped e¤ective polygyny rates. The originality of the
model stems from its ability to link the preferences to both the ecology and the division of
labor between males and females. In particular, the model predicts that either high or low,
but not intermediate, polygyny rates will tend to arise absent institutional involvement. Fur-
thermore, the analysis reveals that the outcome is intimately linked to the extent to which
males engage in food production, monogamy being sustainable only in ecologies in which
males engage in food production. This is because food is a private good, which implies that
the most severe drop in average child survival probability that results from adding wives
arises when the male spends time on food production.
The results challenge the view that the rise of monogamy is a mystery in a world driven by
evolutionary forces. Indeed, they instead suggest that there are two types of environments:
one in which natural selection favors both monogamy and high polygyny rates over interme-
diate polygyny rates, and one in which natural selection favors a high polygyny rate. In the
former type of environment, in our evolutionary past males simply did not achieve a higher
reproductive success by ghting at the margin to get more than one wife; the associated lack
of incentive for males to compete against each other may have led to egalitarian societies
and the rise of monogamy a long time ago, prior to any intervention by rulers (Lagerlöf,
2010, De La Croix and Mariani, 2015). Interestingly, in this type of environment, there is
typically also a preference for low fertility rates. Hence, in such environments, even if male
heterogeneity eventually arose thanks to the intergenerational transmission of wealth, the
31Interestingly, the propensity for monogamy to be more e¢ cient than some levels of polygyny goes hand
in hand with the propensity for low fertility rates to be e¢ cient, since both are driven by a low average
publicness of care.
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population growth may not have been high enough to sustain polygyny through a mismatch
between male and female mating age, as it may have done in Africa (Tertilt, 2006). In
sum, the results suggest that human societies may have split into essentially two groups a
long time ago, the (mainly) monogamous ones and the highly polygynous ones, depending
on the ecology in which their populations had evolved. This split may in turn have laid
the basis for di¤erential success of religions, depending on their attitude towards polygynous
marriage. Indeed, I would even like to argue that this is consistent with the pattern observed
today in the two most represented religions today, Christianity and Islam: one imposes strict
monogamy while the other allows not for two or three wives, but four.
The analysis relies on a model from which many arguably important aspects were left out.
These should be included in future research. Specically, it would be interesting to embed
households more explicitly in a market economy and allow for wealth accumulation over
generations. Allowing for uncertainty in food production, risk sharing within the extended
family, and teamwork between males might also be fruitful. Finally, the theoretical model
may perhaps also be extended in view of studying the evolution of preferences of mothers
and fathers for their children and for each other.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Begin by considering some resident strategy r 2 f0; 1; :::; R  1g, and suppose that the
mutant strategy r0 = r + 1 is present in a share " > 0 of the population. In this population
all males play Fight in the rst r rounds; hence, in each round until round r, the male
population halves, but the share of residents who are still in the race is 1   ". Consider
now round r + 1. In this round, residents play Peace while mutants play Fight. Thus, the
expected reproductive success of a resident who is alive at the beginning of round r + 1 is
(1  ")  1
2r
 fM (2r) + "  0:
With probability 1  " he is matched with another resident, in which case both play Peace,
both survive and each gets to keep the 2r women that he had at the beginning of round
r + 1; otherwise he is matched with a mutant, in which case he gets 0 since he plays Peace
while the mutant plays Fight. The expected payo¤ to a mutant in round r + 1 is
(1  ")  1
2r
 fM  2r+1+ "  1
2r+1
 fM  2r+1 :
If matched with a resident, he wins for sure, and gets 2r+1 women; if matched with another
mutant, he gets 2r+1 women with probability 1/2. Since 1
2r+1
fM (2r+1) > 0, a necessary and
su¢ cient condition for strategy r to be evolutionarily stable against r0 = r + 1 is that
fM (2r) > fM  2r+1 : (27)
Turning now to the mutant strategy which consists in starting to play Peace one round
before residents do, consider some r 2 f1; :::; Rg, and suppose that the mutant strategy
r0 = r   1 is present in a share ". In this population all males play Fight for r   1 rounds,
and at the beginning of round r there is still a share 1   " of residents and a share " of
mutants. In round r the expected payo¤ to a resident is
(1  ")  1
2r
 fM (2r) + "  1
2r 1
 fM (2r) :
With probability " he is matched with a mutant, in which case he survives with certainty to
round r + 1. Otherwise he is matched with another resident, in which case both play Fight.
In round r + 1 there will only be residents around, so any resident who survives to round
r + 1 gets 2r women. The expected payo¤ to a mutant in round r is
(1  ")  0 + "  1
2r 1
 fM  2r 1 :
33
Since 1
2r
 fM (2r) > 0, it is immediate that any r 2 f1; :::; Rg is evolutionarily stable against
mutant strategy r0 = r   1.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
To begin, note that the males maximization problem can be treated as two separate maxi-
mization problems, one for n and one for (x; y), since the objective function can be written
M (x; y; n; k) = k1   g (n)  ~s (x; y) ; (28)
where
g (n) = n1     a (n) (29)
and
~s (x; y) = (T   y)  (T   x) 

x+
y
k

: (30)
Specically, choosing (x; y; n) 2 [0; T ]2  [1;+1) to maximize M (x; y; n; k) boils down to
choosing n 2 [1;+1) to maximize g (n) and (x; y) 2 [0; T ]2 to maximize ~s (x; y).
Starting with the choice of (x; y), note rst that y 6= T , since for any x 2 [0; T ],
~s (x; T ) = 0 while ~s (x; y) > 0 for any y 2 (0; T ). Moreover, (x; y) 6= (0; 0), since ~s (0; 0) = 0
while ~s (x; y) > 0 for any (x; y) 2 [0; T ]  (0; T ). Next, since ~s is strictly concave in (x; y),
it is su¢ cient to study the two rst-order partial derivatives to determine (x; y). Starting
with y:
@~s (x; y)
@y
=

k
 (T   y)  (T   x) 

x+
y
k
 1
(31)
  (T   y) 1 (T   x) 

x+
y
k

:
Dividing this by the strictly positive term (T   y) 1  (T   x)   x+ y
k
 1
and simpli-
fying, one obtains that the sign of @~s(xj ;y)
@y
is the same as the sign of
T   kx   (+ ) y: (32)
This expression is strictly decreasing in y. It is non-negative for all y 2 [0; T ] i¤ it is non-
negative for y = T , i.e., if T   kx    (+ )  0, which is false. The expression in
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(32) is non-positive for all y 2 [0; T ] i¤ it is non-positive for y = 0, i.e., i¤ T   kx  0,
or
x  T= (k)  x1: (33)
Thus, if x 2 (0; x1), there exists a unique y such that the expression in (32) equals zero:
y =
T
+ 
  k
 (+ )
x: (34)
In sum, (
y = 0 if x  x1
y = T
+
  k
(+)
x if x 2 [0; x1] :
(35)
Turning now to x:
@~s (x; y)
@x
=   (T   y)  (T   x) 

x+
y
k
 1
(36)
  (T   y)    (T   x) 1 

x+
y
k

:
Dividing this by the strictly positive term (T   y)  (T   x) 1   x+ y
k
 1
and simpli-
fying, one obtains that the sign of @~s(x;y)
@x
is the same as the sign of
Tk   ( + ) kx  y: (37)
This expression is strictly decreasing in x. It is non-negative for all x 2 [0; T ] i¤ it is
non-negative for x = T , i.e., if Tk   ( + ) kX   y  0, i.e., i¤
y 

k

  ( + ) k


T  y0: (38)
Note that y0  0 i¤ +  : The expression in (37) is non-positive for all x 2 [0; T ] i¤ it is
non-positive for x = 0, i.e., i¤ Tk   y  0, or
y  Tk= ()  y1: (39)
Thus, if y 2 (max f0; y0g ; y1), there exists a unique x such that the expression in (37) equals
zero:
x =
T
( + )
  
( + ) k
y: (40)
In sum, 8>><>>:
x = 0 if y  y1
x = T
(+)
  
(+)k
y if y 2 [max f0; y0g ; y1]
x = T if y  max f0; y0g .
(41)
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Combining (35) and (41), two cases may be distinguished, depending on whether y0  0 or
y0 > 0. First, if +   (i.e., if y0  0),
(x (k) ; y (k)) =
8>><>>:

T
(+)
; 0

if k  (+)

(+)kT T
k(++)
; (+)T kT
(++)

if k 2
h

(+)
; (+)

i
 
0; T
+

if k  
(+)
;
(42)
Second, if 
+
>  (i.e., if y0 > 0)
(x (k) ; y (k)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(T; 0) if k  

T; T
+
  kT
(+)

if k 2
h

[+ (++)] ;


i
(+)kT T
k(++)
; (+)T kT
(++)

if k 2
h

(+)
; 
[+ (++)]
i
 
0; T
+

if k  
(+)
:
(43)
Turning now to the choice of n, one obtains
g0 (n) = (1       ) (1  bn)  n      bn1    ;
which implies that two cases arise. First, if 1     0, g0 (n) < 0 for all n 2 [1;+1),
which implies that n = 1. Second, if 1        > 0,
g00 (n) = (1       )   (+  + ) (1  bn)n    1   2bn   
is strictly negative, so that either n = 1 (if g0 (1)  0), or there exists n > 1 that satises
the necessary rst-order condition for an interior solution, g0 (n) = 0. Since g0 (n) = 0 i¤
n = 1   
(2   )b , the solution writes:
n = max

1;
1       
(2       ) b

:
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Using the notation introduced in the proof of Proposition 3, and letting
s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) = [T   y (k)]  [T   x (k)] 

x (k) +
y (k)
k

;
one obtains the following expression for male reproductive success as a function of k (see
equation (2)):
fM (k) = M (x (k) ; y (k) ; n; k) (44)
= g (n)  k1   s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) :
36
Upon dividing the expression in (44) by the strictly positive constant g (n), one obtains
that d
fM(k)
dk
has the same sign as
(1  )  k   s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) (45)
+k1   ds
 (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
dk
;
where
ds (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
dk
=
@~s (x; y)
@x

(x;y)=(x(k);y(k))
 @x
 (k)
@k
(46)
+
@~s (x; y)
@y

(x;y)=(x(k);y(k))
 @y
 (k)
@k
+
@s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
@k
(for the denition of ~s (x; y), see (30)). From the proof of Proposition 3, one obtains
@~s (x; y)
@x

(x;y)=(x(k);y(k))
 @x
 (k)
@k
=
@~s (x; y)
@y

(x;y)=(x(k);y(k))
 @y
 (k)
@k
= 0;
so that (46) reduces to
ds (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
dk
=
@s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
@k
(47)
=  y
 (k)
k2
 [T   y (k)]  [T   x (k)] 

x (k) +
y (k)
k
 1
=  y
 (k)
k2


x (k) +
y (k)
k
 1
 s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) :
Plugging this expression into that in (45), dividing by the strictly positive term s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
k  
h
x (k) + y
(k)
k
i 1
, and rearranging the terms, one obtains that d
fM(k)
dk
has the same
sign as
A (k)  (1  ) 

x (k) +
y (k)
k

    y
 (k)
k
: (48)
Note the following:
Remark 1. For any (; ) 2 [0; 1]  (0; 1], 1     0 . Furthermore, 1    = 0 if and
only if  =  = 1, in which case A (k) has the same sign as  y (k). The remaining
remarks all pertain to the case    6= 1.
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Remark 2. The term x (k)+ y
(k)
k
, which is the total amount of food produced for each
brood of n children, writes
x (k) +
y (k)
k
=
8>><>>:
T
(+)
if k  (+)

(k+)T
k(++)
if k 2
h

(+)
; (+)

i
T
k(+)
if k  
(+)
(49)
if 
+
 , and
x (k) +
y (k)
k
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
T if k  

(k+)T
k(+)
if k 2
h

[+ (++)] ;


i
(k+)T
k(++)
if k 2
h

(+)
; 
[+ (++)]
i
T
k(+)
if k  
(+)
(50)
if 
+
> . In either case, this term is always strictly positive. Furthermore, it is
strictly decreasing in k whenever y (k) > 0 and constant in k whenever y (k) = 0.
For further use below, let ~k  0 denote the threshold value such that y (k) > 0 i¤
k < ~k, and y (k) = 0 i¤ k  ~k (note that ~k may be smaller than 1):
~k 
(


if 
+
> 
(+)

if 
+
 : (51)
Remark 3. y
(k)
k
is strictly decreasing in k for any k < ~k and constant in k for any k  ~k.
Remark 4. Suppose that ~k > 1. Then A (k) changes sign at most once for k 2 [1; ~k).
Indeed, suppose that there exists some k^ 2 [1; ~k) such that A

k^

= 0, i.e.,
(1  )  x

k^

= (   1 + ) 
y

k^

k^
: (52)
(Note that k^ must indeed be strictly smaller that ~k since A (k) > 0.for any k  ~k.)
Note that since x (k) + y
(k)
k
> 0 for all k, and since (1  )   > 0, both
the left-hand side and the right-hand side of this expression must be strictly positive.
Then, since x (k) is increasing in k and
y(k^)
k^
is decreasing in k, it must be that
(1  )  x

k^

> (   1 + )  y
(k^)
k^
for any k > k^.
Remarks 1 - 4 together imply:
A. If  = 1 and y (1) = 0, then d
fM(k)
dk
= 0 for all k  1.
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B. If  = 1 and y (1) > 0, then d
fM(k)
dk
< 0 for all k 2 [1; ~k) and dfM(k)
dk
= 0 for all k  ~k.
C. If  < 1 and y (1) = 0, then d
fM(k)
dk
> 0 for all k  1.
D. If  < 1 and y (1) > 0, then d
fM(k)
dk
> 0 for all k  ~k > 1. Moreover, a su¢ cient
condition for fM to be non-monotonic in k is that dfM(k)
dk

k=1
< 0, which is true if and
only if
(1  ) [x (1) + y (1)] < y (1) : (53)
Because x (1) and y (1) do not depend on , and since x (1) + y (1) > 0, the
left-hand side can be viewed as an a¢ ne and strictly decreasing function of , which
takes the value 0 for  = 1= and the value x (1) + y (1) > 0 for  = 0. Hence,
(53) is equivalent to
 >
x (1) + (1  ) y (1)
 [x (1) + y (1)]
 ^: (54)
Because A (k) changes sign at most once (see Remark 4), the condition  > ^ is
also necessary for fM to be non-monotonic in k. Furthermore, if  > ^, there exists
k^ 2

1; ~k

such that d
fM(k)
dk
< 0 for all k 2 [1; k^), dfM(k)
dk
< 0 if k = k^, and d
fM(k)
dk
> 0
for all k > k^. Finally, if   ^, dfM(k)
dk
 0 for all k  1, with a strict inequality for all
k  1 if and only if  < ^.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall from Proposition 2 that any r 2 f0; 1; :::; R  1g such that fM (2r) > fM (2r+1) is locally
evolutionarily stable. Thus, any k 2 20; 21; 22; :::; 2R	 such that dfM(k)
dk
< 0 is sustainable,
and so is k = 2R (see Proposition 2).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
A strategy prole
 
xD1 ; x
D
2 ; :::; x
D
k ; y
D
   xD; yD is a Nash equilibrium if and only if(
xDj 2 argmaxxj2[0;1] a (n)  n  sD
 
xj; yD
 8j = 1; :::; k
yD 2 argmaxy2[0;1] a (n)  n 
Pk
j=1 s
D
 
xDj ; y

;
(55)
where (from (18))
sD (xj; y) =

T  y
(kn)



T  xj
n



xj
n
+
y
kn

: (56)
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To begin, note that y = T cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy prole. Suppose,
to the contrary, that
 
xD; yD

=
 
xD;T

for some xD 2 [0;T]k. Then sD  xDj ; yD = 0 for
any xDj 2 [0;T], while for any y 2 (0;T), sD
 
xDj ; y

> 0. Similarly,
 
x; yD

= (0; 0), where
0 =(0; 0; :::; 0), cannot be an equilibrium strategy prole. Indeed, sD (0; 0) = 0, while, for
any y 2 (0;T), sD (0; y) > 0.
Next, it is straightforward to verify that sD (xj; y) is strictly concave in xj. This implies
that for each y 2 [0;T) there is a unique xj that maximizes sD (xj; y), implying that any
equilibrium must be female-symmetric. Hence, it is su¢ cient to use a two-dimensional
vector,
 
xD; yD

, to describe any equilibrium strategy prole. Noting that the term a (n)  n
is irrelevant, and that for xD1 = ::: = x
D
k = x
D,
Pk
j=1 s
D
 
xDj ; y

= k  sD  xD; y, the system
of k + 1 equations (6) reduces to the following system of two equations:(
xD 2 argmaxx2[0;T] sD
 
x; yD

yD 2 argmaxy2[0;T] sD
 
xD; y

;
(57)
where
sD (x; y) =

T  y
(kn)



T  x
n



x
n
+
y
kn

: (58)
Note that, in fact, then, the original k + 1-player game may be viewed as a game between
one male and one female; since the payo¤ functions are continuous and the strategy spaces
are compact and convex, equilibrium existence is guaranteed.
It has already been noted that for each male time allocation y 2 [0;T), there exists a
unique x that is a best response for the female to y. Likewise, for each female time allocation
x 2 [0;T], s is strictly concave in y, implying that for each x 2 [0;T], there exists a unique
y that is a best response for the male to x. Moreover,
sD (x; y) =
1
(kn) nn
 (T  y)  (T  x) 

x+
y
k

:
Letting ~sD (x; y) = (T  y)  (T  x)   x+ y
k

, it is clearly su¢ cient to study the
rst-order partial derivatives of ~sD (x; y) to determine the best response functions.
Thus, for the male:
@~sD (x; y)
@y
=

k
 (T  y)  (T  x) 

x+
y
k
 1
(59)
  (T  y) 1 (T  x) 

x+
y
k

:
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Dividing this by the strictly positive term (T  y) 1  (T  x)   x+ y
k
 1
and simpli-
fying, one obtains that the sign of @~s
D(xj ;y)
@y
is the same as the sign of
T   kx   (+ ) y: (60)
This expression is strictly decreasing in y. It is non-negative for all y 2 [0;T] i¤ it is non-
negative for y = T, i.e., if T   kx    (+ )  0, which is false. The expression in
(60) is non-positive for all y 2 [0;T] i¤ it is non-positive for y = 0, i.e., i¤T   kx  0,
or
x  x1;
where x1 was dened in (33). Thus, if x 2 (0; x1), there exists a unique y such that the
expression in (60) equals zero:
y =
T
+ 
  k
 (+ )
x: (61)
Hence, the males best response to the female strategy x (where x is chosen by each of the
k females) is: (
ym = 0 if x  x1
ym = T
+
  k
(+)
x if x 2 [0; x1] :
(62)
Turning now to the female:
@~sD (x; y)
@x
=   (T  y)  (T  x) 

x+
y
k
 1
(63)
  (T  y)    (T  x) 1 

x+
y
k

:
Dividing this by the strictly positive term (T  y)  (T  x) 1   x+ y
k
 1
and simpli-
fying, one obtains that the sign of @~s
D(x;y)
@x
is the same as the sign of
Tk   ( + ) kx  y: (64)
This expression is strictly decreasing in x. It is non-negative for all x 2 [0;T] i¤ it is
non-negative for x = T, i.e., if Tk   ( + ) kT  y  0, i.e., i¤
y  y0;
where y0 was dened in (38). The expression in (64) is non-positive for all x 2 [0;T] i¤ it is
non-positive for x = 0, i.e., i¤ Tk   y  0, or
y  y1;
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where y1 was dened in (39). Thus, if y 2 (max f0; y0g ; y1), there exists a unique x such
that the expression in (64) equals zero:
x =
T
( + )
  
( + ) k
y: (65)
Hence, a females best response to the male strategy y is:8>><>>:
xf = 0 if y  y1
xf = T
(+)
  
(+)k
y if y 2 [max f0; y0g ; y1]
xf = 1 if y  max f0; y0g .
(66)
Noting that ym is linear and strictly decreasing in x (whenever x 2 [0; x1]), and that xf
is linear and strictly decreasing in y (whenever y 2 [y0; y1]), a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for equilibrium to be unique is that the (absolute value of the) slope of the males
best response curve be strictly smaller than the (absolute value of the) slope of the females
best response curve, which is true:
dym
dx
 = k
(+)
< (+)k

=
1=dxfdy .
Hence, by combining (62) and (66), one gets the unique Nash equilibrium strategy prole 
xD; yD

. By comparing (62) to (35) and (66) to (41), it is immediate that xD = x (k) and
yD = y (k).
6.6 Proof of Proposition 8
For the purpose of this proof some additional notation is introduced. From equation (21)
it is clear that, for any given female it is only the sum of the e¤orts of the other females
that matter, and not how these e¤orts are distributed among these other females. As a
result, when it is necessary to single out how sA depends on the e¤ort of some female under
consideration, say female j, one can write sA (xj;x j; y), where xj is the e¤ort of the female
at hand, and x j is the vector of the other femalese¤orts.
A strategy prole
 
xA1 ; x
A
2 ; :::; x
A
k ; y
A

is a Nash equilibrium if and only if(
xAj 2 argmaxxj2[0;1] n  a (n)  s
 
xj;x
A
 j; y
A
 8j = 1; :::; k
yA 2 argmaxy2[0;1] k  n  a (n)  s
 
xA; y

;
(67)
where (from (21))
sA (xj;x j; y) =

1  y
(kn)


 
1  xj +
P
i6=j (1  xi)
(kn)
!

24
h
xj +
P
i6=j xi
i
kn
+
y
kn
35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and
sA (x; y) =

1  y
(kn)


 Pk
j=1 (1  xj)
(kn)
!

 

Pk
j=1 xj
kn
+
y
kn
!
:
Note rst that y = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy prole. Suppose, to the
contrary, that
 
xA; yA

=
 
xA; 1

for some xA 2 [0; 1]k. Then sA  xA; yA = 0, while, for
any y 2 (0; 1), sA  xA; y > 0. Similarly,  xA; yA = (0; 0), where 0 =(0; 0; :::; 0), cannot be
an equilibrium strategy prole. Indeed, sA (0; 0) = 0, while, for any y 2 (0; 1), sA (0; y) > 0.
Next, it is straightforward to verify that for each
 
xA j; y
A
 2 [0; 1]k 1[0; 1), sA  xj;xA j; yA
is strictly concave in xj. This implies that any equilibrium must be female-symmetric. To
see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists some equilibrium in which k0  1 females
choose x0 while k00 females choose x00 > x0 (and where k0 + k00 = k). Then, it must be that
each female j is indi¤erent between x0 and x00. But strict concavity of sA in xj implies that
for any x000 2 (x0; x00), a female playing x000 rather than x0 achieves a strictly higher payo¤.
Finally, note that for each xA 2 [0; 1]k, sA  xA; y is strictly concave in y.
Because any equilibrium is female-symmetric, any equilibrium srategy prole may be fully
described by a two-dimensional vector, denoted
 
xA; yA

. Furthermore, since sA (xj;x j; y)
is strictly concave in xj for each (x j; y) 2 [0; 1]k 1  [0; 1), and sA (x; y) is strictly con-
cave in y for each x 2 [0; 1]k it is su¢ cient to analyze the rst-order partial derivatives
@sA (xj;x j; y) =@xj and @sA (x; y) =@y to determine the best response functions of the fe-
males and the male.
Writing xA j to denote the (k   1)-dimensional vector whose components all equal xA,
and xA to denote the k-dimensional vector whose components all equal xA, and noting that
the terms n  a (n), k  n  a (n), and 1
(kn)++
are irrelevant, female-symmetry implies that
the system of k + 1 equations (67) reduces to the following system of two equations:(
xA 2 argmaxxj2[0;1] (kn)++  sA
 
xj;x
A
 j; y
A

yA 2 argmaxy2[0;1] (kn)++  sA
 
xA; y

;
(68)
where
(kn)++  sA  xj;xA j; yA =  1  yA  1  xj + (k   1)  1  xA (69)
  xj + (k   1)xA+ yA
and
(kn)++  sA  xA; y = (1  y)  k  1  xA   kxA + y : (70)
43
Next, disregarding the strictly positive term (kn)++ , the sign of @sA
 
xj;x
A
 j; y
A

=@xj
is studied in order to determine a females best response to
 
xA j; y
A

. It is straightforward to
verify that upon division by
 
1  yA > 0 and simplication, the sign of @sA(xj ;xA j ;yA)
@xj

xj=xA
is the same as the sign of
k+ 1     1  xA  xA + yA
k
 1
(71)
 k+ 1     1  xA 1  xA + yA
k

;
which, since k+ 1 > 0, is proportional to and has the same sign as the expression in
(63), which was used to determine the equilibrium time allocation for a female under private
property. Hence, xA = x (k). It follows directly that yA = y (k) as well.
6.7 Proof of Proposition 9
The proof is based on the remark that the reproductive success achieved by a male living in
a household with k females under allomothering in an ecology  =(; ; ; ; ; ; ;  ; ),
~MA (k) = k(1 )  fM (k) (72)
= k1 +(1 )  g (n)  [1  y (k)]  [1  x (k)] 

x (k) +
y (k)
k

;
is the same as that achieved by a male living in a household with k females under private
provisioning in an ecology 0=(0; ; ; ; ; ; ;  ; ) where 0 =   (1 )

, as can be seen
by replacing 0 by   (1 )

in
fM (k) = k  g (n)  1  y (k)
k0

 [1  x (k)]  (73)
x (k) +
y (k)
k

:
The logic followed to determine the shape of fM can therefore be applied here to determine
the shape of ~MA. Specically, one obtains that d
~MA(k)
dk
has the same sign as
B (k)  [1  +  (1  )] 

x (k) +
y (k)
k

    y
 (k)
k
: (74)
Suppose that ~k > 1 (for the denition of ~k see (51)). Then B (k) changes sign at most once
for k 2 [1; ~k). Indeed, suppose that there exists some k 2 [1; ~k) such that B  k = 0, i.e.,
[1  +  (1  )]  x  k = [   1 +    (1  )]  y  kk : (75)
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(Note that k must indeed be strictly smaller that ~k since B (k) > 0.for any k  ~k.) Note that
since x (k)+ y
(k)
k
> 0 for all k, and since [1  +  (1  )]  > 0, both the left-hand
side and the right-hand side of this expression must be strictly positive. Then, since x (k) is
increasing in k and
y(k^)
k^
is decreasing in k, it must be that [1  +  (1  )] x  k >
[   1 +    (1  )]  y
(k)
k
for any k > k. Moreover, since 1  +  (1  ) > 1  
and   1+  (1  ) <   1+ for any  (1  ) > 0, it follows that if  (1  ) > 0
then k > k^ (for the denition of k^, see (52)).
Arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 5) lead to the following
conclusions:
A. If  = 1 and y (1) = 0, then d
~MA(k)
dk
= 0 for all k  1.
B. If  = 1 and y (1) > 0, then d
~MA(k)
dk
< 0 for all k 2 [1; ~k) and d ~MA(k)
dk
= 0 for all k  ~k.
C. If  < 1 and y (1) = 0, then d
~MA(k)
dk
> 0 for all k  1.
D. If  < 1 and y (1) > 0, then d
~MA(k)
dk
> 0 for all k  ~k > 1. Moreover, a su¢ cient
condition for ~MA to be non-monotonic in k is that d
~MA(k)
dk

k=1
< 0, which is true if and
only if
[1  +  (1  )] [x (1) + y (1)] < y (1) : (76)
Because x (1) and y (1) do not depend on , and since x (1)+y (1) > 0, the left-
hand side can be viewed as an a¢ ne and strictly decreasing function of , which takes
the value 0 for  = [1 +  (1  )] = and the value [1 +  (1  )] [x (1) + y (1)] >
0 for  = 0. Hence, (76) is equivalent to
 >
[1 +  (1  )] x (1) + [1 +  (1  )   ] y (1)
 [x (1) + y (1)]
 :
Note that
 =
x (1) + (1  ) y (1)
 [x (1) + y (1)]
+
 (1  )

= ^+
 (1  )

;
where ^ is dened in (54). Because B (k) changes sign at most once (see above), the
condition  >  is also necessary for ~MA to be non-monotonic in k. Furthermore, if
 > , there exists k 2

k^; ~k

such that d
~MA(k)
dk
< 0 for all k 2 [1; k), d ~MA(k)
dk
< 0 if
k = k, and d
~MA(k)
dk
> 0 for all k > k. Finally, if   , d ~MA(k)
dk
 0 for all k  1, with a
strict inequality for all k  1 if and only if  < .
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6.8 Proof of Proposition 11
Recall, from equation (3), that
dfM (k)
dk
= n  a (n) 

s (x; y; n; k) + k  @s (x; y; n; k)
@k

j(x;y;n;k)=(x(k);y(k);n(k);k)
:
Recalling the expression for s (x; y; n; k), one obtains
@s (x; y; n; k)
@k
=    k  1

T   y
n



(T   x)
n



x
n
+
y
kn

   y
k2n
 k 

T   y
n



(T   x)
n



x
n
+
y
kn

:
Since all the term in brackets are strictly positive, @s(x;y;n;k)
@k
has the same sign as   
k  1   y
k2n
k , an expression which is non-positive for all parameter values, and strictly
negative if  > 0 or y (k) > 0. By the same token, and since n (k) is constant in k, this
implies that the value of the upper bound, [n  a (n)  s (x; y; n; k)]j(x;y;n;k)=(x(k);y(k);n(k);k), is
decreasing in k if  > 0 or y (k) > 0, and is constant otherwise.
6.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Recall from Proposition 10 that any r 2 f0; 1; :::; R  1g such that fM (2r) >   fM (2r+1)
is locally evolutionarily stable. Clearly, any k 2 20; 21; 22; :::; 2R	 such that dfM(k)
dk
 0 is
sustainable. Turning to values of k for which d
fM(k)
dk
> 0, Proposition 11 implies that there
exists some t 2 N n f0g such that fM (2t) >   fM (2t+1) (where t may or may not be smaller
than R  1, depending on the value of  and the value of R).
6.10 Proof of Proposition 13
Since eF (k) = fM (k)
k
= g (n)  k   s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) ; (77)
and since g (n) > 0, one obtains that d
eF (k)
dk
has the same sign as
   k  1  s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) + k   ds
 (x (k) ; y (k) ; k)
dk
: (78)
The following arguments use some results shows in the proof of Proposition 5. First, the fact
that ds
(x(k);y(k);k)
dk
 0 (see equation (47)), together with the fact that s (x (k) ; y (k) ; k) >
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0, implies that the expression in (78) is strictly negative for any  > 0. Furthermore, the
fact that ds
(x(k);y(k);k)
dk
 0 if and only if y (k) = 0 implies that if  = 0, d eF (k)
dk
= 0 for all
k  1 if and only if y (1) = 0.
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